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File:
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[pdf]
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Title:
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Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model
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Authors:
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Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page
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Key Words:
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Tiebout, Simulated Annealing, Political Institutions
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Abstract:
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We construct a computational model of Tiebout competition and show that political
institutions differ in their ability to sort citizens effectively. In particular,
we find that certain types of institutions---those that become more ``politically
unstable'' as citizen heterogeneity increases---perform relatively poorly given a
single jurisdiction, yet these same institutions perform relatively well when
there are multiple jurisdictions. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon which
draws upon simulated annealing, a discrete nonlinear search algorithm.
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