Productivity
Revelation and the
Dynamics of Group Formation
Ivanna Ferdinandova
IDEA
Michael Heaney
University of Chicago
2001 Graduate Workshop in
Computational Economics
Homework Problem (2001) –
Solution
·
Objective:
High grades – Each individual is motivated to belong to the group that will
yield her the highest grade.
·
Group
solutions – Individuals submit solutions as a group; individual grades are
determined on the basis of the group product.
Individuals are free to join a group of size one or higher.
·
Difficulty
– Homework problems do not vary in expected difficulty over the course of the
semester.
·
Productive
members
^ Groups with more productive members will earn
higher grades than groups with less productive members, ceteris paribus.
·
Optimal
group size
^ Groups that are close to the optimal number of
members will earn higher grades than groups than groups with more or less than
the optimal number of members, ceteris paribus.
·
Stability
^ Groups that are able to remain stable over time
will earn higher grades than groups that sustain a high degree of turnover, ceteris
paribus.
III.
Problem: The productivities of individuals are difficult to observe directly. Therefore, groups will be uncertain as to
which individuals will best serve their objectives of grade maximization.
·
H1:
Increases in the observability of individual productivities will decrease the time
it takes for groups to become stable.
·
H2:
Increases in the observability of individual productivities will increase the
variance of group grades.
·
H3:
Increases in the observability of individual productivities will increase the
average of group grades (i.e., the positive effect of stability overwhelms the
negative effect of sorting).
·
Individuals
randomly join groups during the first week.
They lack knowledge of their own productivities or the productivities of
their classmates at that time.
Individuals learn their own productivity after the first week.
·
Groups
form with sizes varying from 1 to 6.
·
Grades
= average productivity * size * stability
·
Average
productivity = simple average
·
Size
= { 1.0 if the group has one member
{ 1.1 if the group has two members
{ 1.2 if the group has three members
{ 1.3 if the group has four members
{ 1.2 if the group has five members
{ 1.1 if the group has six members
·
Stability
= Percent turnover in the group.
·
Individuals
compare their productivities to the group grade. If their productivities are lower than the group grade, they are
satisfied. If their productivities are
higher than the group grade, they are dissatisfied.
·
Dissatisfied
individuals put up a “flag” indicating that they would like to join another
group.
·
All
groups observe the flagging individual’s productivity with some degree of
certainty.
·
Each
group calculates the expected value-added by each flagging individual and makes
an offer to the flagging individual with the highest expected value-added,
assuming this value is positive (if the highest value is negative, then no
offer is made).
·
Each
flagging individual evaluates all her offers and accepts an offer from any
group with a grade higher than her individual productivity. If no group has productivity higher than her
individual productivity, she forms her own group (with one member).
·
Undertake
next homework (if not week 15).
·
Repeat
for 14 weeks.
1
2
3
…
Week # of Gps Avg.
Grade Grd. Var. # of Gps w/ Turnover
1
2
3
…
Week # of Gps Avg.
Grade Grd. Var. # of Gps w/ Turnover
1
2
3
…
·
H1:
# of Groups w/ Turnover=0 will reach 0 first under high certainty, followed by
moderate and low certainty.
·
H2:
Weekly grade variance will be higher under high certainty, followed by moderate
and low certainty.
·
H3:
The average of the average weekly grade will be highest under high certainty,
followed by moderate and low certainty.
·
Attitudes
toward risk – make some of the individuals/groups in the class risk averse/neutral/seeking
with regard to grades. Examine how
variations in these attitudes affect grade averages, variance, and group
turnover.
·
Updating
information – What kind of information can be gained from individuals’
decisions to leave/remain in a group?
Can groups draw reliable inferences about member behavior conditioned on
grades of the group she is seeking to leave.
·
Discounting
– to what extent can variations in discount rates affect the willingness of
individuals to remain in groups that offer grades lower than their average
productivities.
·
Coalitions
– Whenever the benefits are shared evenly (regardless of size}, but individual
membership in a coalition may be a liability for the coalition. E.g., international coalitions when some
nations may “misbehave.”
·
Vacancy
chains – Sorting behavior whenever there are status differences among
groups. E.g., thin labor markets, such
as the market for CEOs.
·
Mating
/ Dating behavior – When group size is limited to a maximum of two.